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A strong paradox is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic when it comes to pre-
arranged sales of troubled businesses as a going concern in an insolvency procedure. 
While tons of ink have been shed to explain distinctive features and comparative 
advantages of out-of-court and formal (court-sanctioned) restructurings these days 
there is an increasing trend to employ both with a view to achieve optimal outcomes. 
The accelerated judicial approach to business sales plaits the informal approach and 
the state-controlled statutory approach of dealing with corporate distress. This article 
investigates the extent to which formal insolvency procedures in the UK and the USA 
can be customized through pre-planning to achieve business sales and critically 
evaluates the challenges brought about by the plaiting. It is argued that the accelerated 
approach to business sales in insolvency tends to shift the key properties of the 
statutory procedure from creditor coordination and plan formulation towards 
verification of pre-arranged transactions and in doing so it obviates the need for 
judicial involvement. This way it creates a vacuum of control over the quality of  
business decision–making and eliminates the inclusiveness of the statutory procedure 
leaving ample room for rent-seeking by insiders. To mitigate these deficiencies the 
article suggests a more responsive approach with increased accountability and better 
equipped evaluation to control abuse.  
 




The most important recent development in contemporary insolvency law and practice 
is a marked shift from liquidation and creditor wealth maximisation to corporate 
rescue and value preservation. Insolvency laws in mature jurisdictions have developed 
rescue-oriented procedures to facilitate that goal. Most of those rescue-oriented 
procedures are premised on the notion that keeping the business and the assets 
together will result in increase in value over what could be obtained in liquidation. 
Therefore, at least in theory, the rescue process is all about preserving the so-called 
“going concern” surplus1 of those businesses that may be financially distressed yet are 
still economically viable or efficient. Conversely the liquidation process is better 
suited to those businesses that are economically unviable,2 freeing up resources to be 
invested to new business ventures in the economy. 
 
The going-concern surplus can be captured by a successful turnaround of the 
distressed company, which leads to the preservation of the legal entity itself so that 
the company can continue operations after reorganization, i.e. company rescue, or by 
the sale of the debtor’s assets and business as a going concern so that the actual 
business and its activities will remain as a cohesive productive unit but under a new 
ownership, i.e. business rescue.3 Legislation leaves it to affected parties to decide 
                                                        
 
1 It refers to the surplus (additional value) that is believed to be generated by the sale of the business as 
whole as compared to the sale of the firm’s assets in a piecemeal fashion. Namely, the going concern 
value could be measured by estimating the income stream that the assets would generate if they were 
kept together, taking into account the risk of reorganisation failure and comparing it to the amount that 
the assets would realise if they were sold off separately. See G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law: 
An Anglo-American Perspective, (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008), 3. DG Baird and TH Jackson, 
‘Corporate Reorganisation and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment of Adequate 
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 97, 109. 
See also TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press, Harvard 
1986), 184. 
2 Michelle White opined that the economically inefficient companies are those whose resources would 
be more valuable in some alternative use; whereas the resources in the economically efficient 
companies have no higher value use elsewhere despite their financial distress. See M J White, ‘Does 
Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?’ 72 (1994) Washington University Law Review 3 
1319, 1319. However, it is empirically difficult to distinguish financial and economic distress. It is 
often not obvious whether a troubled company in financial difficulty is still economically viable or not 
and the judgement varies among different parties due to their possession of information about the 
company and their private interests.  
3 The analysis will not discuss the assumption/ premise whether going concern value is preserved in the 
sale.  For discussions on going concern surplus, see DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘The End of 
Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55   Stanford Law Review 751, 758. RV Butler and SM Gilpatric, ‘A Re-
Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy’ (1994) 2 American Bankruptcy Institute Law 
Review 269.  
 
(through the various voting mechanisms) the best option for value preservation which 
is then affirmed through formal procedures.  
 
Interestingly, the use of insolvency proceedings to sell a business as a going concern 
to new owners as a means of resolving distress has increased dramatically in recent 
years at the expense of the traditional company rescue approach. In particular, 
achieving going concern sales through a formal insolvency procedure in an expedited 
manner has gained considerable popularity in insolvency practice both in the UK and 
the USA in the last two decades. Many distressed companies have been pushed to 
conduct a business sale as a result of a mixture of a difficult trade environment and 
tight credit conditions during the post-2008 financial turmoil and ensuing economic 
slowdown. These conditions included inability to obtain new bank loans to refinance 
existing debt, lack of trade orders, and lack of investors willing to offer fresh capital. 
At the same time, rapid changes have been observed in corporate finance practice 
with the emergence of hedge funds and private equity groups as important players 
replacing in some areas traditional commercial banks as sources of capital.4  
 
Achieving going concern sales through a formal insolvency procedure is often 
conducted in an expedited manner. In the USA, business sales can be part of a formal 
plan of Chapter 11 reorganization, but more often they are undertaken using a special 
section of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code – Section 363(b) – that can greatly facilitate 
these sales in an expedited manner (“section 363 sales”).5 In the UK, going-concern 
sales are often conducted through the so called “pre-packaged administration” process 
(“pre-packs”), where arrangements of a sale of a distressed business have been 
negotiated with prospective purchasers and agreed by the major creditors6 prior to the 
commencement of the administration procedure, with the sale being completed fairly 
quickly after the appointment of an administrator.7 Both the US section 363 sales and 
                                                        
4 DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘Anti-Bankruptcy’ (2010) 120 Yale Law Journal 648, 659. 
5 In practice, s 363 sales are the preferred method of selling assets in the context of Chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases. See Fishman and Gouveia, ‘What’s Driving Section 363 Sales after Chrysler and 
General Motors?’ (2010) 19 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 351, 352. 
6 This paper uses the expression “major creditors”, as shorthand for the parties which could exert some 
degree of influence on the disposal process, including the senior secured bank creditors, significant 
trade creditors or bondholders.  
7  No formal definition of “pre-packs” or of similar strategies appears within the UK insolvency 
statutes. The key difference between pre-packs and business sales within the boundaries of 
the UK pre-pack sales take a similar form of fast-tracking formal insolvency 
procedures to achieve value realization through going concern disposals.  
 
Such accelerated routes for business sales in insolvency essentially present an 
innovative approach to overcome the hold-out problem in contractual informal 
workouts whereby entering a formal procedure helps to solidify the outcome of 
private negotiations, at the same time, to overcome the anti-commons problem 
associated with the statutory approach by developing a more market-driven decision-
making apparatus than the one found in the formal insolvency procedures. It therefore 
plaits both formal (state-supplied) and private workout approaches in solving 
corporate distress. This article uses the term “plaiting” to refer to this approach.  
 
This form of plaiting allows certain parties to customize statutory procedures in a way 
that upsets, to some extent, the balance between the debtor and some creditors and 
challenges the inclusiveness of the statutory procedures. This article investigates the 
extent to which formal insolvency procedures in the UK and the USA can be 
customized through pre-planning to achieve business sales and critically examines the 
challenges brought about by the plaiting. The article argues that this approach tends to 
obviate the need for judicial involvement in business decision-making and the 
functions of statutory procedure (or state rules) are moving away from creditor 
coordination and plan formulation towards verification of pre-arranged transactions. 
While the plaiting approach may be a sound solution to the commons-anti-commons 
dilemma and might be the only sound route when the value of the company subject to 
the pre-arranged sale risks suffering the “ice-cube” effect, the customization may 
create a vacuum of control over the quality of the business decision-making process at 
the pre-formal stage. To mitigate these deficiencies, the article argues that a new 
balance must be struck between procedural efficiency and protection of creditor 
interests by means of appropriate valuation mechanisms. Also the accountability of 
the decision-making and enforcement institutions should be enhanced, since their role 
is to examine and verify, in a speedy way, compliance with legal requirements, rather 
than acting as rubber-stabbing bodies as currently seems to be the case. 
                                                                                                                                                              
administration is that the pre-pack sale is arranged before the appointment of administrator and outside 
the administration procedure. 
 
 
The article is divided into 5 sections with the present introduction. Section B sets the 
stage for comparison and analysis by examining the rationale and approaches to 
allocation of decision-making authority in the statutory rescue regimes of the UK and 
the USA. Section C critically analyzes the respective approaches to pre-arranged 
expedited sales in UK and USA insolvency law and practice. It will highlight the 
extent to which parties can customize formal bankruptcy procedures through pre-
planning to achieve expedited sales. This is to show how the pressure to buttress pre-
arranged deals has been accommodated or perverted in the surveyed insolvency 
regimes. Section D considers different approaches in dealing with the intensified 
tension between procedural efficiency and creditor protection in the two jurisdictions 
and offers arguments in favour of increased formal control and accountability in 
decision-making. Section E concludes.  
 
B. The commons, anti-commons problem in insolvency and the rise of pre-
arranged business sales  
 
Corporate debt may be worked out privately following debtor/creditor negotiations or 
by way of a formal filing which will trigger the initiation of an insolvency procedure 
and the ensuing deployment of state-supplied rules to address corporate distress. 
Private workouts follow a contractual approach whereby parties have broader 
discretion to choose the rules that will govern their relationship and contract around 
those rules. In contrast, the state-supplied approach is designed under insolvency 
legislation so that the parties are subject to more elaborately drawn rules which 
impose stronger restrictions on their conduct. 8  It allows compromises and 
arrangements for debt restructuring to be made under the supervision of the court or a 
formal legal structure.  
 
In private workouts, creditors’ consent is essential to effectuate a workout and every 
creditor would have to credibly commit to not enforcing his individual rights by 
                                                        
8 JC Lipson, ‘Against Regulatory Displacement: an Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises’ (2015) 
17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 673, 700.  
vetoing a workout for strategic reasons.9 Sophisticated creditors may be tempted to 
hold out for a better deal. This behavior can frustrate any private rescue attempt to the 
detriment of a potential going concern surplus. Baird and Jackson present this 
situation in their creditors’ bargaining model that is based on the common pool 
metaphor and which leads to ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ situations when exercising 
individual debt collection remedies against the defaulting debtor.10 
 
The contractual approach is widely regarded as incapable to deal with strategic 
bargaining and the hold-out problem, and therefore the coordination cost could be 
high. Thus, from an economic analysis perspective the imposition of state-supplied 
insolvency rules can address coordination problems, i.e., the near impossibility of 
contracting among the diverse parties with an interest in the debtor’s assets,11  and 
other market failures that are normally present in private workouts when addressing 
the common pool problem. 12  Accordingly, insolvency law should be primarily 
understood as a collective procedure seeking to overcome destructive asset grabbing. 
To combat the common pool problems, statutory proceedings impose a 
comprehensive moratorium on individual enforcement rights and lock all creditors 
into a collective procedure.13 In augmenting this approach state-supplied rules further 
resolve the commons problem by allowing a majority of those whose interests are at 
                                                        
9  On the commons problems in private workouts, see R de Weijs, Harmonization of European 
Insolvency Law and the Need to Tackle Two Common Problems: Common Pool and Anticommons 
(Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No 16, 2011), J Armour and S Deakin, 
‘Norms in Private Insolvency: The ‘London Approach’ to the Resolution of Financial Distress’ (2001) 
1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 21-51. See also M Schillig, ‘Corporate Insolvency Law in the 
Twenty First Century: State Imposed or Market Based? (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, 
6-9. 
10 MJ Roe, ‘The voting prohibition in Bond Workout’ (1987) 97 Yale Law Journal 232, 235-238. See 
also R Gertner and D Scharfstein, ‘A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization law’ 
(1991) 46 The Journal of Finance 1189, 1200-1201. 
11 TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ 91 (1982) Yale 
Law Journal 857, 866-67. 
12 The common pool problem is a race of the creditors on the debtor’s assets in a commons situation 
where too many individual enforcement rights resulting in a premature liquidation of the debtor 
company. 
13 Schillig, ‘Corporate Insolvency Law in the Twenty First Century: State Imposed or Market Based?, 
3. See also TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press, Harvard 
1986), 122. 
stake to agree on whether a proposed plan should be accepted or not preventing 
individual creditors from engaging in ‘hold-up’ tactics.14  
 
Notwithstanding the benefit of collective statutory proceedings in minimizing 
coordination problems and costs in insolvency, the formal collective approach appears 
limited when accommodating business sales as an option for value preservation in 
appropriate circumstances. On the one hand, insolvency legislation provides various 
mechanisms whereby compromises and arrangements can be made under the 
supervision or necessary restraints of legislative contemplations.15 For the purpose of 
providing adequate protection for various groups of creditors, as well as checks and 
balances on the conflicting incentives held by different stakeholders, the legal 
proceedings often involve complicated accountability requirements and rounds of 
negotiations to conclude the approval of a rescue plan. This makes the formal 
approach a complex process that is both lengthy and costly. 
 
One the other hand, rescue-oriented statutory procedures are often designed on the 
presumption that maximum of value of the pool would be achieved through a 
successful rescue of the falling company. But reality suggests that there only is a very 
remote possibility of saving the company where the debts are cripplingly high when 
companies are put in the statutory procedures. Value maximization of the asset pool 
often depends upon the timeline of critical decision-making and execution. The longer 
the problem the fewer options become available and the further deterioration in value, 
especially those in emergency situations where speed is crucial for preserving the 
value of the company’ assets.   
 
                                                        
14 Minority dissenters in the legal proceedings are therefore bound to the deal the majority prefer in 
order to avoid inefficient holdout behaviour.  
15  For instance, a creditors’ meeting will be convened within a practically reasonable period; the 
reorganisation plan needs to be accepted by the majority of the allowed claims. Under English 
administration procedure, the administrator’s proposals are passed when support is obtained from a 
majority in value of those present and voting creditors, either in person or by proxy. In the US, claims 
and interests are dealt with by classes, specifying unimpaired and impaired classes. A plan is deemed to 
be accepted when at least two-thirds of votes and more than one-half in number of allowed claims of 
each voting class of creditors, and two-thirds in amount of the shares for a class of equity interests, 
have accepted it. 
The anti-commons problem 16  becomes even more acute because the statutory 
procedures tend be quite slow when time may be a clear factor in the preservation of 
the going concern surplus which delay and uncertainty in reaching critical decisions 
can undermine. Clearly the potential economic disruption generated by the length of 
proceedings gives claimholders the incentive to look for alternative restructuring 
strategies.  
 
Both the UK pre-pack sales and the US section 363 sales are fast-track procedures 
that aim at facilitating business rescue through going-concern sales. Namely, they aim 
at maximizing value realization through going concern disposals. Section 363 allows 
substantial asset sales to be implemented prior to the confirmation of a Chapter 11 
plan and therefore much faster and at a much lower procedural cost than a sale 
effected as part of a plan of reorganization.17 Similarly, by privately pre-arranging a 
deal before the company is put into administration, the UK pre-pack sales help the 
parties to circumvent possibly time-consuming and expensive administration 
proceedings. Therefore, the pre-arranged sale process offers an attractive and 
streamlined process that is capable to maximize value realization by permitting a 
timely disposal of the failing business and, thus, salvaging the worthwhile parts of the 
company that might otherwise have been jeopardized by the uncertainty and costs of 
lengthy formal proceedings.     
 
Despite these clear advantages, the accelerated approach of going concern sales in 
insolvency is at the same time fraught with controversy. First, the increasing 
                                                        
16 The term “anti-commons” is a shorthand for a broad class of problems requiring the assembly of 
permissions or entitlements accompanied with the worry “that a value-enhancing assembly – one that 
could leave every party better off than the status quo – will fail to occur as a result of strategic holdout 
behavior and other transaction costs. Like the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anti-
commons makes inefficiency transparent by creating a self-contained system in which participants 
make themselves worse off.” See LA Fennell, ‘Commons, anticommons, semicommons’ in K Ayotte 
and HE Smith (edt ) Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law (Edward Elgar 2011), 41. 
17 S 363 sales are typically completed within two to three months, whereas creditor confirmation of a 
reorganization plan may span several years. For example, the sales of General Motors and Chrysler 
businesses under s 363 took forty and forty-two days respectively prove this point. See RE Steinberg, 
‘Seven Deadly Sins in S 363 Sales’ (2005) 24 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 22, 22. In 
contrast, plan confirmation requires compliance with all of the detailed confirmation requirements 
under s 1129 of the Code, including approval of a disclosure statement and successful solicitation and 
voting on the plan.  
popularity of pre-arranged sales in insolvency in both countries has led to concerns 
that the statutory procedures have shifted toward excessive premature liquidation of 
financially distressed companies.18 In the US, concerns have been raised that this 
trend may lead market mechanisms to dominate the new speedier Chapter 11 
procedure which relies heavily on asset sales and arrangements negotiated prior to 
bankruptcy.19 In the UK, critics have expressed concerns about the fact that pre-pack 
deals are often determined at the beginning of the deliberation process when a 
solution is sought to the company’s financial distress. Namely, that they have become 
the default solution, neglecting the statutory requirement to consider rescuing the 
company, as the administrator, when appointed at a late stage, has no opportunity to 
consider thoroughly the possible routes to rescuing the company.20  
 
These concerns highlight the commons anti-commons dilemma in corporate rescue. 
On the one hand, a collective action prescribed by the statute is needed to overcome 
difficulties in coalition formation by prescribing claimants a clear order of preference 
as well as a fair opportunity to participate in the aggregative pool of assets enabling 
them to be treated according to the size and seniority of their claims. On the other 
hand, when it comes to value presentation, privatisation of formal rules has been 
advocated, especially in connection to the decisions over business issues. The key 
argument here is that the state-supplied rules often vest decision-making authority in 
the hands of parties such as judges or authorized court officers who may not 
particularly well equipped to decide on business matters, given that resolution of 
                                                        
18 Over the past decade, this debate has become increasingly relevant in the USA, where it has been 
suggested that asset sales have come to replace traditional reorganization as the primary means of 
resolving financial distress. See Baird and Rasmussen,‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (describing a 
fundamental shift in chapter 11 bankruptcy from a reorganisation vehicle to a means of liquidation 
driven in large part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current 
assets ass greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future). Baird and Rasmussen 
(2002) speculate that “corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared.” JC Lipson and C Divirgilio, 
‘Controlling the Market for Information in Reorganisation, (2010) 18 American Bankruptcy Institution 
Law Journal 647. They note that “[i]nstead of providing a substitute for a market sale, Chapter 11 now 
serves as the forum where such sales are conducted.” Id. 653. 
19 S Franken, ‘Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’ (2004) 5 
European Business Organization Law Review 645, 668. See further Baird and Rasmussen, ‘The End of 
Bankruptcy’, 786-8; DG Baird, ‘Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of 
Corporate Reorganizations’, (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 921, 941. Cf LM LoPucki, ‘The Nature of 
the Bankrupt Firm: A Reply to Baird and Rasmussen’s The End of Bankruptcy’, (2003) 56 Stanford 
Law Review 645, 670-1 (stating that empirical data shows that reorganization is still an important 
reason for large publicly held companies to file for bankruptcy).  
20 P Walton, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations - Trick or Treat’ (2006) 19 Insolvency Intelligence 113, 
115-16. 
financial distress involves high degrees of uncertainty and creativity best addressed 
through both informal and formal mechanisms.21 
 
The next section will examine closely the plaiting approach that enabled pre-arranged 
sales in the UK and the USA. It questions whether plaiting remedies the commons 
anti-commons dilemma with a view of value preservation and highlighting the effect 
on vacuuming control over the quality of commercial decision-making in the process.  
C. Charting an accelerated route for business sales in insolvency–Critical 
Analysis of the UK and US approaches  
At this point it should be noted that the UK and the USA take different governance 
approaches in buttressing insolvency law functions. Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code is, in principle, a bargaining-oriented procedure in the sense that its emphasis is 
on classes of claimholders working to resolve their differences through a process of 
bargaining and negotiation to come up with a reorganization plan under the court’s 
supervision and intervention.22 In doing so, the US approach operates on the debtor-
in-possession (DIP) principle, which allows companies’ incumbent management to 
remain in office and run the business in the ordinary way during the reorganization 
process with the exclusive power in drafting the reorganization plan.23 At the same 
time, Chapter 11 includes multiple mechanisms designed to supervise the DIP.24 
Furthermore, the US bankruptcy law has premised its governance structure on a 
regulatory system that attracts much intervention from the bankruptcy courts, which 
play a central role in evaluating the feasibility of the plan and in general ensuring an 
effective operation of the legal framework. By contrast, the UK administration 
procedure takes a professional-led discretionary approach in the governance of the 
case, under which directors of the troubled company are required to transfer their 
control of the company to an external insolvency practitioner as soon as the statutory 
procedure is triggered. The UK law envisages that the administrator is suitably 
                                                        
21 JC Lipson, ‘Against Regulatory Displacement: an Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises’ (2015) 
17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 673, 700.  
22 McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law: An Anglo-American Perspective, 115-16. 
23 For the relative merits of the US DIP model and the British PIP model, see D Hahn, ‘Concentrated 
Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations’ (2004) 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 117. 
V Finch, “Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue” (2005) 25 Legal Studies 374. 
24 Those mechanisms include a mandatory creditors’ committee, designed to “investigate the acts, 
conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business 
and the desirability of the continuance of such business and any other matter relevant to the case or to 
the formulation of a plan…” see 11 USC s 1103(c)(2).  
qualified and once appointed is free to act with a considerable breadth of discretion 
without court involvement, except where directions are sought.25  
1. Pre-pack Sales in the UK 
(a) Customising the Administration Procedure through Pre-packing 
 
Conventionally, once the company is put into administration, the coordination and 
control of the company’s affairs are concentrated in the hands of the administrator, 
who is vested with extensive powers to do anything necessary for the management of 
the affairs, business and property of the company. These powers extend to selling a 
substantial part of the business as a going concern.26 Having reviewed the company’s 
business and affairs, the administrator must set out his proposals for achieving the 
purpose of the administration and put them together in a statement. He will then 
initiate a creditors’ meeting to allow those who will be principally affected by the 
implementation of the plan, mainly unsecured creditors,27 to vote on the proposals put 
forward, subject to certain exceptions.28 
 
The UK administration procedure is multi-faceted. This is manifested by its provision 
for a hierarchical list of possible objectives for the procedure. Paragraph 3 of 
Schedule B1 to the IA 1986 lists three statutory objectives arranged in descending 
order for administrators to pursue,29 at the same time provides a set of instructions 
                                                        
25 Administrators may apply to the court for directions in connection with his functions, but mainly for 
serious legal or procedural problems. Para. 63 of Sch. B1 to the IA 1986.  
26 Para.59(1) of Sch.B1 to the IA 1986.  
27 Para.73(1)(a) of Sch. B1 to the IA 1986 provides that the administrator’s proposals cannot affect the 
rights of a secured creditor to enforce its security. Therefore, normally, only unsecured creditors are 
entitled to vote on the proposals. Secured creditors are only entitled to vote where their claim exceeds 
the value of their security. See R.2.40(1) IR 1986. They are, however, entitled to vote in respect of the 
full value of their claims if the meeting is required under para.52(2) of Sch. B1. 
28 A resolution on the administrator’s proposal requires only overall majority in value of the debts 
owed to those present or voting. See R 2.42(1), (2) IR 1986.  
29 Para. 3 (1)  
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be 
likely if the company were wound up (without first being in administration), or  
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.  
about how the administrator should decide which objective to pursue.30 Apparently, 
rescuing the distressed company is the prioritized objective of administration. 31 
Notwithstanding this assertion a rescue decision in administration is subject to the 
statutory conditions that rescue is reasonably practical to achieve and would attain a 
better result for the company’s creditors. 32 Nevertheless, neither of the conditions is 
often satisfied. This is because companies usually arrive at administration after the 
debtor has explored possible debt restructuring solutions informally with relevant 
creditors, and those efforts normally begin and fail prior to the triggering the statutory 
approach, at which point either the company is in dire straits, or a possible solution 
has been found and pursued to some degree. In such a case the administrator may 
decide that a going concern sale is the best way forward.33  
 
There are two ways to achieve business sales through an administration in the UK:  
business sales within administration and pre-packaged sales. Understandably, a 
business sale within administration may also involve a certain degree of planning 
activities such as information gathering taking place before the appointment of the 
administrator. Yet the main decisions (to whom to sell, at what price) and proceedings 
are driven by consideration and assessment that follows the appointment of the 
administrator.34 A pre-pack, in contrast, is essentially a pre-determined contractual 
arrangement.35 The critical factor that distinguishes a pre-pack sale from a business 
sale within administration is that the details of the sale have been almost irrevocably 
arranged prior to the official appointment of the administrator.36 As the substantial 
work of how to deal with the company is carried out at the pre-formal stage, little is 
left to be arranged in the context of the statutory procedure, apart from agreeing on 
administrator remuneration and distribution.  
                                                        
30 Only if he thinks that particular circumstances defined in the statutes are present, can he descend a 
step through the statutory hierarchy and consider the next possible objective. The statute further 
provides some criteria for selecting from the three objectives. See para. 3(2),(3),(4). 
31 The emphasis on company rescue of the revised UK administration regime is modest. That is to say 
that an administrator is obliged to pursue a going concern sale where he thinks this is the best course 
for the interests of the creditors as a whole, even where it might be possible to rescue the company.  
32 Para. 3(3) of Sch. B1 to the IA 1986. 
33 The rationale behind the sale is often justified on the basis that selling a business as a going concern 
is likely to realise more value than on a break-up sale of assets. 
34 S Frisby, A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations (Report to R3, 2007), 9. 
35 Ibid., 11. 
36 Ibid., 9. See also Walton, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations – Trick or Treat’, 115–16.  
If it is right to say that the administration procedure was originally contemplated to 
create a supportive platform in which administrators play a key role in evaluating all 
possible options, aiming to achieve an optimal outcome for creditors as a whole, the 
pre-packaged version of the process challenges this traditional contemplation about 
the statutory procedure. The role of the administrator in business decision-making is 
now partially discharged by the debtor’s incumbent management. Namely, the focus 
of the insolvency decision-making in the pre-pack framework is on the pre-formal 
negotiation stage. Insolvency practitioners’ role at this stage is considerably 
constrained by the timing of their involvement and the role they played at the pre-
formal stage.37 Clearly it is the incumbent management who are likely to play the 
determining part in the pre-administration negotiations since management retains 
extensive decision-making control over the company at this stage through residual 
managerial powers.38  
 
Once the statutory procedure has been triggered and administrators have been 
appointed to effectuate the pre-determined business sale, administrators must use their 
commercial judgement on whether the pre-negotiated arrangements to sell the 
business in a way that has attracted the best price is practically achievable.39 While 
administrators’ decisions are subject to the rationality test, 40  they have broad 
discretion in verifying the pre-negotiated arrangements. 
Arguably, the UK pre-pack administration goes half-way towards the US DIP 
governance model, as it allows a market-driven transfer of functions from the 
                                                        
37 B Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: the Pre-pack Approach in Corporate Rescue (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2016), 78 
38 This is different from the institutional arrangements of the statutory procedure which contemplate 
that the powers of the directors are considerably curtailed by the administrator’s appointment, though 
the appointment does not in itself affect the status of a director as such. Still the directors cannot 
exercise management powers which could interfere with the exercise of the administrator’s duties and 
competences, see Para.64 of Sch. B1 to the IA 1986. Furthermore, they have a duty to co-operate with 
the administrator; breach of this duty by company directors may lead to their disqualification. S 235 IA 
1986 and ss 6 and 9 of Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Also, the administrator has the 
power remove and appoint a director of the company. Para.61 of Sch. B1 to the IA 1986. 
39 See R J Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP, Oxford 2005), 237. The 
word ‘thinks’ in para. 3 of Schedule B1 means that the administrator will have to reach a considered 
view [about which objective to pursue]. See Hansard HL vol 633 cols 569-70  (10 April 2002). 
40 The basic formulation of the rationality requirement is that the administrator must not act in a way in 
which no reasonable administrator would act in the particular circumstances of a case. Lightman et al., 
The Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies, 246. See related cases Re Edennote Ltd, 
Tottenham Hotspur plc and others v Ryman and another [1996] 2 BCLC 239; Edge v Pensions 
Ombudsman [2000] Ch 602. 
administrator to the existing management, especially with respect to control over the 
sale, at least the decision to sell. 41  Therefore, the role of the administrator as 
representative of the interests of the creditors as a whole is significantly weakened.  
(b) Problems with the weakened role of Administrators in pre-pack sales 
 
The reduction of the administrator’s role goes against the logic behind the statutory 
procedure. The latter envisages that the legal rights of enforcing private contracts are 
taken away and replaced by the independent administrator’s function who is granted 
central power to coordinate the process to achieve an optimal outcome for creditors as 
a whole. And as this central power is emptied an anti-commons problems arises. On 
the other hand, the adequacy of the sale price would go a long way in alleviating the 
anti-commons problem for creditors. Yet in practice there are considerable doubts as 
to whether the best possible sale price is achieved and whether the current safeguards 
are sufficient to secure such an outcome. 
First, the ideal way to sell a business usually is to dispose of it at market value, which 
normally can be identified through an extensive process of advertising the business to 
the relevant interests. Owing to the (sometimes inevitably) expeditious nature of the 
pre-pack process, businesses are rarely marketed broadly. This means that potentially 
interested buyers stay essentially in the dark about the possibility of acquiring the 
business unless they follow their “hunch” and make unsolicited enquiries themselves. 
This restricted marketing inevitably has an effect on the pricing of the business to be 
disposed of. Arguably, for reasons that have to do with confidentiality, continuity of 
business, business reputation and the effect that any sale negotiations can have on the 
company’s suppliers and customers, it may be very hard to hold a public auction for a 
distressed company or its assets. But this casts serious doubt on whether the best 
possible price for the sale of the business could ever be secured without marketing to 
attract potential purchasers.42  
 
                                                        
41 Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: the Pre-pack Approach in Corporate Rescue, 228. 
42 B Xie, “Protecting the Interests of General Unsecured Creditors in Pre-packs: The Implication and 
Implementation of SIP 16” (2010) 31 Company Lawyer 189,194. M Crystal QC and R Mokal, ‘The 
Valuation of Distressed Companies – a Conceptual Framework’ (2006) BEPRESS Legal Series 
Working Paper 1370, 3.  
Furthermore, the high frequency of pre-pack sales to a connected party, which may be 
the directors of the troubled company, the company’s major shareholder or a company 
that is controlled or has a certain relationship with the directors or the major creditors 
or shareholders of the ailing company, 43  has only intensified concerns about the 
possibility of undervalued sales. Not unreasonably insiders are expected to take 
advantage of information gained through their position to further their own ends in the 
transaction.44 The most common way to achieve this would be withholding essential 
information or not making reasonable efforts to promote competing bids, including 
carrying out little or no marketing of the business to non-connected parties. This way 
insider’s rents are maximized instead of the sale price, prejudicing the size of 
creditors’ payouts.  
 
The remedy to this situation is far from obvious. For example involving 
administrators with negotiations occurring before their appointment risks 
compromising the independence of the insolvency practitioner. This is an important 
concern as the same administrator may coordinate the statutory procedure once his 
appointment is fixed in a manner that serves the preferences of powerful players,45 
given also directors’ ability to appoint administrators out of court.46 Credible research 
has shown that directors formally influence who is appointed in the majority of 
                                                        
43 Insolvency Service statistics in its report on the operation of SIP 16 show that 73% of pre-pack sales 
during 2013 were to parties connected with the insolvent company, 79% of pre-pack sales during 2011; 
for 2010, the figure was 72%. The Insolvency Service, 2013 Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner 
Regulation (April 2014), 10. The figure for the first 6 months of 2012 was 69% of pre-packs. See The 
Insolvency Service, 2012 Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation (June 2013), 4. The 
Insolvency Service, Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16: 1 January to 31 
December 2011, 11. For the first six months of 2009, the figure was 81%. The Insolvency Service, 
Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16: July – December 2009, 14. 
44 They may be aware of “soft” information about the business’s viability, future prospects, which is 
not yet sufficiently precise to be included in any documentation. 
45 There is a worry that “the advisor may have been too aligned with certain interests –which may be 
those of well-placed creditors or involved managers.” V Finch, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations: 
Bargains in the Shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy Bargains’ (2006) Sep Journal of Business Law 568 
574. See also V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd Edn, CUP, 
Cambridge 2009) 471-72. 
46 Under the Enterprise Act 2002, the holder of a qualifying floating charge, the company, and the 
directors may appoint an administrator out of court. Appointment by the company or the directors is 
subjected to the approval of any person entitled to appoint an administrative receiver or any person 
who is or may be entitled to appoint an administrator under para.14. See paras.14, 22, 25 and 26 of 
Sch. B1 to Insolvency Act 1986. 
administration cases47 and this arguably makes it much harder to keep administrators 
shielded from undue directorial influence. When directors are considering appointing 
an administrator, they will discuss the different rescue scenarios with potential 
candidates. The directors are likely to appoint an insolvency practitioner who is 
willing to apply a ‘practical’ and ‘cooperative’ approach, or worse someone they 
think to be amenable to their preferences in handling the insolvency of the business.  
 
Moreover, with regard to the issue of marketing of the sale, even if we are to assume 
that confidentiality and reputation concerns would limit the circle of potential buyers 
who could be sounded to buy the business this may not be an obstacle per se to 
achieving a competitive price. Discount funds and potential trade buyers from the 
same industry would still have an interest in acquiring a company in distress or its 
assets. In any case even within the aforementioned limitations a serious effort must be 
expended to identify and attract potential purchasers and generate competing bids. 
The fact that often most of the marketing effort takes place before the appointment of 
an administrator48 and is mainly carried out by incumbent management inevitably 
gives rise to an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion as to how competitive was the 
process through which a sale price has been arrived at. Moreover, even if directors did 
have an incentive to seek competitive price buyers might encounter a “market for 
lemons” situation.49 Namely, in the face of severe information asymmetries potential 
buyers would equally mistrust scrupulous and unscrupulous sellers and thus discount 
                                                        
47 According to the OFT’s study, 75% of the 500 administration records in Companies House starting 
in 2006 are director- led appointments. 13% were directly appointed by secured creditors. See OFT, 
The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioner – a Market Study (OFT1245, June 2010), para. 4.5 
and ft 35. Although it remains unclear what is the corresponding statistic in pre-pack cases, a 
predominance of director-led appointments is likely to be the case for pre-packs too. It should be noted 
that many of these director-led appointments are creditor-driven as it is common that secured creditors 
invite directors to appoint to distance themselves.  More about the appointment approach in 
administration, see  Frisby, A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations, and J Armour, A 
W Hsu and A Walters, The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence 
from the UK (2008) 5 European Company and Financial Law Review 148. 
 
 
48  Walton and Umfreville’s study of Pre-packs found that marketing began prior to the IPs’ 
involvement in over a third of all cases where any marketing was carried out. See P Walton and C 
Umfreville, Pre-pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and Outcome Analysis of Pre-pack 
Administration (Report to Graham Review, April 2014), 21.  
49 See G Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. 
good assets in order to avoid losing money from the acquisition of potentially bad 
assets.  
2. The Section 363 Sales in the USA Chapter 11 process  
(a) The Mechanics of Section 363 Sales 
The US Bankruptcy Code provides two separate and distinct sets of provisions under 
which a Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession (“DIP”) or trustee may sell property free 
and clear of claims or interests.50 Section 1123(a)(5)(D) governs sales made as part of 
a plan of reorganization (hereafter referred as “in-plan sales”).51 As sales pursuant to s 
1123(a)(5)(D) are accomplished in the context of a reorganization plan, they require a 
debtor to satisfy plan confirmation requirements, including approval of a disclosure 
statement and creditor acceptance by voting of applicable classes of creditors and a 
good faith requirement. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code governs sales within or 
outside the ordinary course of business of the debtor company; in particular, 
subsection 363(b) governs sales outside the ordinary course of business and prior to a 
reorganization plan.52 Section 363(b) does not automatically permit the sale of all or 
substantially all assets of the debtor’s estate in a Chapter 11 reorganization. However, 
the courts have acknowledged that this restriction is subject to exceptions, especially 
where a particular case demonstrates the necessity of the sale to serve the best 
interests of the estate, and where imposition of strict rules for authorization of asset 
                                                        
50 Asset sales can take place either prior to any bankruptcy petition or during the bankruptcy procedure. 
Sales outside of bankruptcy can be challenged under state law as fraudulent conveyances when 
creditors think the sale price is inadequate. Critically the risks of fraudulent conveyance are eliminated 
when the asset sale is conducted under bankruptcy court supervision, since s 548 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code, which grants the trustee the power to avoid fraudulent transfers, applies only to pre-petition 
transfers. 
51 Pursuant to s 11232(a)(5)(D) US Bankruptcy Code, a company may implement a reorganization plan 
through the “sale of all or any part of the property of the estate.”  Further, section 1123(b)(4) provides 
that “a plan may . . . provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the 
distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders of claims or interests.” 
52 Section 363 grants the trustee or DIP the right to use, sell, or lease property of the estate under 
certain conditions. There is no clear test for determining when a sale is in the “ordinary course of 
business”. However, two tests have been developed under the case law: the “vertical dimension” test 
under which the court focuses on the specific transaction and determines whether it is of a type that the 
parties in interest reasonably expect the debtor to conduct in ordinary course of its business and the 
“horizontal dimension” test where the court focuses on a comparison between the debtor’s business and 
businesses in the same industry to determine whether the proposed transaction is in the ordinary course 
of such business. See SD Consins, ‘Chapter 11 Asset Sales’ (2002) 27 Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law 835, 841-42. 
sales may prevent parties from acting quickly, resulting in an adverse impact on the 
value of the assets concerned.53
 
 
When the company is operating under Chapter 11 protection, typically, the debtor will 
enter into an asset purchase agreement with a pre-selected buyer known as a ‘stalking 
horse’ bidder and the agreement will be presented to the court for its approval. Once 
the process and bidding procedures have been approved to enable other potential 
purchasers to submit bids, other bidders may appear forcing an auction.54 After the 
completion of the auction, the bankruptcy court will conduct a hearing to consider 
whether the sale to the successful bidder (normally the one that provides the highest 
purchase price or total consideration) should be approved.  
 
In terms of the procedural requirements for 363(b) sales, the Bankruptcy Rule 
2002(a)(2) requires that notice is given to all interested parties before the proposed 
sale. Courts generally permit debtors to shorten the notice period based on the 
exigencies of a particular case provided that the reduced notice period is sufficient to 
ensure that all interested buyers have an opportunity to bid for the assets.55 Individual 
creditors, creditor committees, United States Trustees, as well as potential buyers, can 
object to proposed sales and bidding procedures under the Bankruptcy Rule 6004(b). 
Beyond the Federal Rules, there are local bankruptcy rules made by district courts 
providing court-specific procedural rules governing proposed s 363 sales to help 
streamline proceedings.56  
                                                        
53 The Second Circuit in In re Lionel Corp. 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) noted that “the bankruptcy 
machinery should not straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to prevent him from doing what is best 
for the estate.” It was acknowledged that the likelihood of maximizing value for one debtor may 
necessitate a different method for another. Therefore, the court affirmed that “to further the purposes of 
Chapter 11 reorganization, a bankruptcy judge must have substantial freedom to tailor his order to meet 
differing circumstances”. See 772 F.2d at 1069. 
54 S Gilson et al, ‘Cashing Out: The Rise of M&A in Bankruptcy’ 2015 Harvard Business School 
Working Paper 15-057.  
55  RM Fishman and GE Gouveia, ‘What’s Driving Section 363 Sales after Chrysler and General 
Motors?’ (2010) 19 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 351, 355. 
 
56 Each district court acting by a simple majority of its district judges may make and amend rules 
governing practice and procedure in all cases and proceedings within the district courts’ bankruptcy 
jurisdiction subject to relevant Acts of Congress. Local rules often provide greater detail about such 
issues as to who must receive notice; how long before a hearing notice must be given; how objections 
can be made; how public versus private sales will be conducted; and which connections, relationships, 
Once a Section 363 sale has been consummated and the buyer pays the agreed 
consideration, the proceeds of a s 363 sale become property of the distressed firm that 
can be used to satisfy the claims of its creditors.57 Apart from any claims or liabilities 
assumed by the buyer, any other outstanding claims against the company remain in 
the company, subject to satisfaction through the reorganization plan.58 Until the court 
has approved (or “crammed down”) the reorganization plan, the company remains 
under bankruptcy protection.  
Conducting a s 363(b) sale prior to the confirmation of Chapter 11 plan speeds up the 
conclusion of the process and there are good reasons premised on business efficacy to 
justify this shift, especially where there is a clear and imminent danger that the value 
of the company or its assets will diminish the longer it stays within the Chapter 11 
process, so-called “ice-cube” effect. On the other hand, there are serious concerns that 
the expedited chapter 11 process relies too heavily on asset sales and plans negotiated 
prior to bankruptcy.59 The latter is a very important development, because the terms 
or the effect of a pre-plan transaction may subvert the protections of Chapter 11, 
undermining the procedural value of the statutory regime.  
Section 363, in theory, provides just a formal mechanism through which the debtor 
(or appointed chapter 11 trustee), upon approval by the court, can sell all, or a portion 
of, the entity’s assets to a third party before achieving acceptance by the creditors of 
the plan of reorganization.60 It is not tantamount to a de facto reorganization plan. A 
reorganization plan is much more comprehensive than a s 363 sale. It has to address 
the overall financial situation of the entity and the effects of its plan on creditors when 
it emerges from bankruptcy. But, the approval of a section 363 sale of all or of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
and compensation must be disclosed, etc. See JA Wilkerson, ‘Defending the Current State of Section 
363 Sales’ (2012) 86 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 591, 597.  
 
57 The buyer will obtain title to the purchased assets free and clear of any prior liens and claims, as well 
as any claims or liabilities assumed by the buyer. 
 
58 Like in-plan sales under s 1123 via 1141(c), s 363(b) transactions are “free and clear of all claims 
and interests of creditors” via s 363(f). 
59 See Baird and Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’, 786-8; Baird, ‘Control Rights, Priority Rights, 
and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations’.  
60 Sales within the ordinary course of business of the debtor are governed by s 363(a), where prior 
notice to creditors or an opportunity for a hearing is not required (s 363(c)(1) US Bankruptcy Code). 
But sales outside the ordinary course of business governed by s 363(b) are subject to certain level of 
scrutiny from creditors and the bankruptcy court. 
substantial portion of an entity’s assets inevitably has a significant impact on the 
determination of important issues that would ordinarily be addressed as part of the 
reorganization plan.  
There is a sub rosa61 prohibition in common law to prevent a proposed s 363 sale 
from functioning as a de facto reorganization plan. The doctrine restricts the 
permissibility of a transaction or agreement which commits such a substantial part of 
the debtor’s assets that it would de facto predetermine the terms of a reorganization 
plan, dictate the terms of a plan, or otherwise restructure creditors’ rights. 62 
Nevertheless, in US courts’ more recent jurisprudence on the sub rosa issue63 offers 
only a loose standard for the determination of the sub rosa prohibition and most s. 
363(b) transactions have been allowed to proceed.64 Yet, it has been made clear that 
the sale of all or substantially all of debtors’ assets via s 363(b) could in itself dictate 
the terms of a subsequent plan.65 The bottom line here is whether the terms of the sale 
constitute an attempt by the debtor to circumvent the distribution scheme of the 
Bankruptcy Code, in other words, whether the terms for the allocation and/or 
distribution of the sale proceeds among creditors and equity holders is contrary to the 
Code’s priority scheme.66  
                                                        
61 The Latin phrase sub rosa here means “confidential, secret, not for publication.” The reach of this 
restriction was exemplified by the Fifth Circuit of the US Court of Appeal’s decision in Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983) 
62 “The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the recruitments of Chapter 
11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in 
connection with a sale of assets.” See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re 
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935 at 940 (5th Cir. 1983) 
63 There was a sub rosa issue in this case: the s. 363(b) sale was contested by the Pension Trust on 
grounds that it constituted a sub rosa, and thus it amounted to a “secret plan” to reorganize Chrysler’s 
assets that should have been conducted within Chryslers reorganization plan under Chapter 11 of the 
Code. 
64 A Karam, ‘The Chrysler Bankruptcy and Future of 363(b) Transactions’ (2011) XI Houston Business 
and Tax Law Journal 395, 425.  
65 The Second Circuit in the Lionel case pointed out that: “Every sale under s363(b) does not 
automatically short-circuit or side-step Chapter 11, nor are these two statutory provisions to be read as 
mutually exclusive.”722 F.2d at1071. 
66 See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 2001 WL 1820326 at 11 (Bankr D Del Apr.2, 2001). An 
example can be the case In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), where the Second 
Circuit held that a settlement in the course of bankruptcy proceedings was inappropriate because it 
distributed assets to prepetition creditors as part of the agreement and the settlement allowed the 
negotiating parties to sidestep the fair and equitable standard as well as the absolute priority rule of the 
bankruptcy plan confirmations. See 478 F.3d 453 at 462-65.  
Said prohibition will not be easily applied to a going concern sale of a substantial part 
of the business as long as all the proceeds of the sale would be allotted to creditors 
according to the Chapter 11 priority scheme.67 Furthermore, the mere fact that the 
terms of the sale lead to more favourable treatment of certain claimholders than other 
creditors in the same class or in a higher class is not considered as contrary to or 
undoubtedly restructuring the Code’s priority scheme.68  
The plan confirmation process is an important step in Chapter 11 proceedings as it 
introduces creditor scrutiny and DIP accountability. Plan confirmation is a relatively 
democratic process, since it requires a debtor to propose a reorganization plan and 
work with creditors to obtain their approval. Therefore, in-plan transactions under s 
1123 provide a much greater level of participation and protection to creditors than 
does a s 363(b) sale. As part of the plan confirmation process, sales pursuant to s 1123 
approval is subject on a constellation of requirements. For example, s 1125 sets out 
disclosure requirements69 aiming to help claim-holders’ evaluation of the proposed 
sales before voting. Also following claim-holders’ approval the court will confirm the 
plan provided that it meets the comprehensive requirements of subsection s 1129(a) of 
the Code.70  
This heavier degree of judicial scrutiny contrasts with the much lighter procedure for 
approval of s 363(b) transactions which only requires “notice and a hearing” before 
the bankruptcy judge. In addition, a s 363(b) pre-plan sale may be approved by 
bankruptcy courts without an actual hearing if the notice is given properly and if such 
a hearing is not requested in a timely manner by a party in interest or if there is 
                                                        
67 In Chrysler the court asserted that the proposed s. 363(b) transaction was not a sub rosa plan because 
the debtor would receive more than fair value in return for the sale of assets to Fiat, based on the 
valuation and the fact that Fiat was the only entity willing to help Chrysler, which otherwise might 
have been forced into a total liquidation, and all the sales proceeds would be distributed according to 
the Chapter 11 priority scheme. 405 B.R. at 97-98. Similarly, in GM, as regards the sub rosa 
accusation put forward by a group of bondholders, the court noted that since the proceeds of the sale 
would be allotted to creditors according to the Chapter 11 priority scheme. See 407 B.R. 463, at 481-
82. 
68 The court in Chrysler stated that the executory contracts New Chrysler would take over through the 
sale did not violate the priority rules of a Chapter 11 plan, even though they received more favourable 
treatment than other creditors in the same class or in a higher class. 405 B.R. at 98-99. 
69 In-plan sales are subject to the s 1125 requirement of disclosure statements describing the terms and 
conditions of the plan to enable claimholders to make meaningful evaluation on the proposed sales. 
70 This requires among other things, that the sale is in the best interests of creditors and be accepted by 
all impaired classes of creditors, or that it has the support of at least one class of impaired creditors and 
it is fair and equitable. 
insufficient time to hold a hearing before the sale is effected.71  As regards court 
approval of s 363(b) sales, the statute itself provides no guidance about the kind of 
standards that courts are to apply for approving or disapproving the sale, 
notwithstanding the rigorous requirements of chapter 11 plan confirmation. Thus, the 
courts, in exercising discretionary power, have to mould their own views and try to 
balance the authority to sell all or a substantial part of the debtor’s assets against the 
potential for abuse where the parties evade Chapter 11 safeguards. Therefore, the 
additional safeguard of plan confirmation is rendered redundant in the context of s. 
363(b) sales. 
(b) Judicial Scrutiny of s 363(b) Pre-plan Sales  
 
Despite silence in the statute about the standards that courts should apply for 
approving a s. 363 sale, the Code gives bankruptcy judges broad equitable power to 
do what is necessary.72 Certain guidelines have been established in case law on how 
to approach s. 363(b) transactions, although no court offered fixed or more concrete 
standards through which they can analyse these transactions, nor the Supreme Court 
has shown any intention to provide lower courts with a concrete set of standards.  
 
The prevalent standard for court approval of s. 363(b) sales is the sound business 
justification standard,73 articulated by the Second Circuit in In re Lionel Corp.74 In 
this seminal decision, the court recognized the danger of “swallowing up chapter 11’s 
safeguards” through the disposition of important assets under s 363(b) without a 
sound business justification. Thus, it held that there must be “a good business reason” 
                                                        
71 S 102(1)(b) US Bankruptcy Code.  
72 S 105(a) allows the court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title … shall be construed to preclude the 
court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to 
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.” It should be noted that a 
bankruptcy court is not allowed to use s. 105(a) in contravention of express statutory language. See the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). The Supreme Court stated that 
it was “hornbook” law that § 105(a) “does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates 
of other [Code] sections”. (Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1195). 
73 Also known as "sound business purpose" or "business judgment". 
74 Committee of Equity Security Holders v Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.) 772 F. 2d 1063 (2d Cir. 
1983) In this case, the debtor proposed to sell its most significant asset – 82 per cent of the common 
stock of its solvent, profitable, publicly traded subsidiary corporation. Four days after proposing the 
sale, the debtor filed a plan of reorganization that was conditioned on the pre-confirmation sale and the 
distribution of the sale proceeds to creditors.  
for approval of the sale of substantial assets by the debtor outside of a reorganization 
plan.75 To construe a good business reason, the Second Circuit instructed bankruptcy 
judges to consider a list of factors.76 Amongst those factors the fluctuation of the 
value of the assets, as suggested by the Second Circuit, was the most important 
criterion to consider in determining the propriety of a proposed sale under s 363(b).77  
 
Nevertheless, financially distressed companies have been increasingly looking to s 
363(b) for a faster, less burdensome, and cheaper resolution to their financial ailments 
since the Second Circuit set forth its seminal decision in Lionel in 1983. In parallel 
with the increased number of sale approvals, there has been a movement away from 
the strict emergency and perishable goods rationales that were used to justify an 
urgent need to sell towards adopting a more liberal yet inconsistent application of the 
Lionel standards for approving s. 363 sales. This is exemplified in the Second 
Circuit’s recent reconsideration of the s. 363 pre-plan sale in the In re Chrysler LLC78 
case and the approval of the 363(b) transaction in the General Motors (“GM”) case79 
                                                        
75 The Second Circuit in determining whether to affirm the sale’s authorization reasoned that “there 
must be some articulated business justification, other than appeasement of major creditors, for using, 
selling or leasing property out of the ordinary course of business before the bankruptcy judge may 
order such disposition under section 363(b).” The court held that The Lionel creditors’ committee on 
the sale in this case did not constitute a sufficient business justification because: (a) as a matter of fact, 
there was no evidence that the sale could not be completed pursuant to a plan at the same price and (b) 
as a matter of law, as approval of the sale at the behest of the creditors’ committee ignored the equity 
interests required to be weighted and considered under Chapter 11. See 722 F.2d 1063, at 1070-1071.  
76 Those factors include the proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole; the amount of time 
that has elapsed since the filing of the petition; the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be 
proposed and confirmed in the near future; the effect of the proposed sale on a future plan of 
reorganization; the proceeds to be obtained from the dispositions vis-à-vis any appraisals of the 
property; which of the s 363 alternatives, use, sale, or lease, the proposal envisions; and most 
importantly, perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value. See 772 F. 2d 1063 at 
1071. 
77 Whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value was the determining criterion in establishing 
that there was no good business justification for the sale in this case because it was considered that the 
common stock that was the subject of the sale was not falling in value. See 772 F. 2d at 1071-1072.  An 
example of such an urgent need to sell can be found in the case In re Baldwin United Corp, where the 
court considered that the sale of partnership interest constituting 40 per cent of debtor’s assets 
articulated a sound business justification. It acknowledged that the nature of such interest would, if not 
sold promptly, only impede reorganization and would lose value as an asset in the long term. In re 
Baldwin United Corp., 43 B.R 888 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) at 905-06. 
78 Ind. State Police Pension Trust v Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009) affirmed, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009). In this case secured creditors advanced one of the major 
objections to the proposed pre-plan sale: that the sale benefited certain unsecured creditors more than 
those with collateral. The Second Circuit in In re Chrysler LLC applied the Lionel business justification 
standard in approving the sale of substantially all of the assets of Chrysler LLC and its subsidiaries and 
upheld the bankruptcy court’s approval of the sale of the company to Fiat over the objections of certain 
creditors. 
79 In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). In this case, GM proposed to sell 
by the same bankruptcy court which heard Chrysler. Both Chrysler and GM arguably 
stretched the limit of what is permissible in traditional s 363 sales by justifying the 
urgent need to see on the basis of the costs of a lengthy formal procedure, fear of 
limited offers, and the looming effects of a total liquidation, instead of strictly 
immediate emergency.80   
More recently in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 81 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Texas recognised that the evolving nature of s. 363 sales and the associated 
concerns that “the concept of debtor reorganization and rehabilitation is in peril”82. 
Without altering the essence of the sound business justification test established in 
Lionel, Judge Steen provided a nonexclusive list of factors that should be considered 
when determining whether to approve a 363(b) sale prior to confirmation of a Chapter 
11 plan. 83  Said list integrated several new factors into the analysis, including 
considerations as to whether the proposed purchase agreement facilitates competing 
bids and whether the assets in question have been aggressively marketed in an active 
market. 84  Other considerations referred to the disinterestedness of the debtor’s 
fiduciaries which necessarily involves an investigation into the underlying 
relationship between the debtor and the purchaser. 
The key improvement in Judge Steen’s updated guidelines is the emphasis on 
marketing efforts when judging the reasonableness of the purchase price, and a 
market test may to some extent dictate the fair value of the estate and prevent abuses 
                                                                                                                                                              
most of its assets to a government-sponsored buyer to whom it would also assign the health and 
welfare benefits of GMs employees. GM struck the agreement for the sale following government-
sponsored attempts to restructure out of court. The US and Canadian Governments were the only 
entities willing to extend financing for the transaction, on the condition that such financing would be 
used within a six-week time period after which they would rescind the offer. 
80  Commentators have criticized the courts in Chrysler for permitting s 363 sales to be used as 
substitutes for reorganization and for denying creditors the right to actively negotiate to enhance their 
own interests. See DA Skeel Jr., ‘Why the Chrysler Deal Would Horrify a New Dealer’ (2009) 
American Enterprise Institute Scholar Posts < http://www.aei.org/publication/why-the-chrysler-deal-
would-horrify-a-new-dealer/ > accessed 30 January 2018. 
81 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2009). 
82 404 B.R. at 419. 
83 404 B.R. at 422-427.  
84 See Fishman and Gouveia, ‘What’s Driving Section 363 Sales after Chrysler and General Motors?’ 
(2010) 19 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 351, 354. 
that stem from undervaluation.85 But still the speed of the s. 363(b) sale process will 
likely preclude an effective market test and the safeguards that the test ensures. 
Because the fast pace of s. 363(b) sales often requires that any competing bids be 
submitted within a matter of days this time limitation can predictably impede 
competitive market valuation of the assets.86  
In general, recent modifications of the guidelines on how courts should exercise their 
discretionary power in approving s. 363(b) sales have not saved the application of 
judicial scrutiny from being criticized for being open to manipulation thus offering 
insufficient protection against possible abuse of s 363.87 This happens because the 
business justifications presented by the bankruptcy courts generally center around 
saving time or money. Consequently parties can manipulate the courts’ application of 
the principle of business justification by creating immediate necessity, which often 
serves as an overriding factor when weighing the potential misuses of s 363 sales.88 
As businesses struggle or approach failure, they have the ability to manufacture an 
emergency by delaying bankruptcy filings until the last possible moment,89 since the 
hurdle to achieving a 363(b) sale is no more than a mere notice and a hearing. Yet the 
deal to sell can be so substantial that it often de facto dictates the core terms of the 
reorganization plan. This opens the door to abuse of the whole process. When they 
exercise their power to approve the s. 363(b) sale the courts essentially also verify the 
economic merits of the pre-plan sale. But the courts have not fashioned yet a 
makeshift safeguard as a sufficient substitute for the Chapter 11 plan safeguards 
(disclosure, voting, acceptance, and confirmation).  
The recent case In re Jevic Holding Corp.90 in a way reflects the Supreme Court’s 
                                                        
85 Professor Barry E. Adler advocated putting all large s 363(b) sales through a stringent market test to 
ensure fair price and prevent abuse, see Oversight of TARP Assistance to the Automobile Industry: 
Field Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 97-108 (2009).  
86 AJ Warburton, ‘Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: a Primer’ (2010) 
60 Syracuse Law Review 531, 567. 
87 It has been argued, following both decisions, that the US courts applied inconsistently the business 
justification analysis established in the case of In re Lionel, relying on this principle only for factual 
comparisons. See K Korres, ‘Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections Through 
Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in s 363 Asset Sales, and a Refined Standard to 
Safeguard Against Abuse’ (2013) 63 Florida Law Review 959, 971. 
88 Ibid., 973. 
89 Ibid., 974. 
90 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. _(2017). This case concerned a settlement, implemented 
through a structured dismissal (a dismissal of the case together with an agreement to settle various 
desire to limit bankruptcy courts’ discretion and require the courts to be further bound 
to the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court held that the 
bankruptcy court could not order a structured dismissal that distributes estate assets in 
a manner that violates the Code’s ordinary priority rules without the consent of 
creditors. 91 However, the Supreme Court carved out from its ruling some interim 
distributions. 92  In doing so, the Court distinguished cases in which courts have 
approved interim settlements resulting in distributions of estate assets in violation of 
priority rules, with nonconsensual violations in the context of a dismissal which 
amount to a final distribution of estate value.93  
The issue of priority is a matter of contention in 363 sales and it is unclear to what 
extent the Jevic decision may affect the court’s balancing of procedural efficiency and 
creditor protection. In particular, does the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
bankruptcy court’s attempt to reach a resolution to address Jevic’s “dire 
circumstances”, as there was no alternative, suggest that courts may take a more 
structured, rules driven approach in approving pre-plan sales rather than relying on 
equitable or “best under the circumstances” reasoning and subsequent distributions? 
Would such a shift make the sub rosa plan arguments more weighty?   
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in its recent decision in In re Old Cold 
LLC94 provided some indication that courts will limit Jevic’s reach in the context of 
                                                                                                                                                              
issues), which provided distributions to Jevic’s secured creditors and general unsecured creditors but 
no distributions to certain priority employee claims.    
 
91  The Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement and dismissal over the objections of the wage 
claimants and the U.S. Trustee. The court recognized that the settlement and dismissal violated the 
ordinary priority rules of the Code, but held that, without the settlement and dismissal, there would be 
no meaningful distribution for any creditor, accordingly approval of the structured dismissal was 
appropriate.  The District Court affirmed, holding the priority rules of the Code were “not a bar to the 
approval of the settlement as it is not a reorganization plan.”  The Third Circuit affirmed. But the 
Supreme Court reversed the judgement. 
  
92 Examples of such distributions include first-day wage orders and critical vendor orders that may 
violate priority rules but have value of preserving the debtor as a going concern. 
93 An example is In re Iridium Operating LLC, the Second Circuit’s authorization of an interim 
distribution of settlement proceeds to fund a litigation trust that would press claims on the estate’s 
behalf. 
94 In re Old Cold LLC, No. 16-9012, 2018 WL 387619 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2018). The chapter 11 debtor 
auctioned off substantially all of its assets pursuant to section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. One of 
two bidders participated in the auction is Schleicher and Stebbins Hotels LLC (“S&S”), the stalking 
horse bidder, who was both a secured creditor and the majority stockholder of the Debtor. S&S was 
declared the winning bidder, with a bid providing for the payment of certain unsecured claims (i.e., the 
363 sales, when it refused to apply Jevic to disturb an asset sale under section 363(b). 
One of the issues considered by the First Circuit was whether Jevic’s rationale should 
extend to a section 363(b) sale in Old Cold. 95  The First Circuit affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s authorization of a 363 sale suggesting that the ability of purchasers 
to assume junior debt (such as important vendors and suppliers) while leaving behind 
senior debt is an important feature of many 363 sales and any decision that would 
limit such ability could have had a severely negative impact on the use of 363 sales.96 
 
D Addressing the tension between procedural efficiency and creditor 
protection  
 
The accelerated approaches have reformulated the way in which assets are 
restructured or disposed in insolvency and shift the key function/utility of formal 
procedures from the traditional provision of a platform to adopt key decisions to a 
mere verification process.  
 
Undeniably the pre-arranged sales are efficiency-enhancing, remedying the anti-
commons problem that arises as result of the need for lengthy negotiations among 
heterogeneous creditors in the context of statutory proceedings. As shown in section 
C, there is a certain level of denial of (junior) creditor participation in both of the 
accelerated approaches to going concern sales in both countries. Let’s suppose, the 
estate is subject to an ice-cube effect97, then the only realistic way to maximize value 
and preserve the going concern surplus is to sell the business as a going concern as 
quickly as possible. Pre-arranged sales bypass the voting mechanism and narrow the 
range of potential bargaining. Thus, they minimize the likelihood of destruction of 
business value caused by potential strategic actions of certain creditors. 
                                                                                                                                                              
prepetition unsecured debt assumed by S&S) before certain administrative claims. 
 
95 In particular, the propriety of the sale violated the priority rules in contravention of Jevic because the 
winning bidder provided for the payment of certain unsecured claims (i.e., the prepetition unsecured 
debt assumed by S&S) before certain administrative claims.  
 
96 The First Circuit rejected the argument that “Jevic’s enforcement of priority rules applies to all end-
of-case distributions, including asset sales.” In re Old Cold LLC, No. 16-9012, 2018 WL 387619 (1st 
Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) at 10. 
97 The term is used to metaphorize a distressed company as a melting ice cube to justify a quick sale 
soon after a formal procedure commences. See MB Jacoby and EJ Janger, ‘Ice Cube Bonds: 
Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy’ (2014) 123 Yale Law Journal 862. 
 
Nonetheless, the efficiency gains are achieved at the expense of creditor participation 
which is one of the fundamental safeguards of formal procedures. The pre-arranged 
sale route is therefore often criticized for undermining procedural inclusiveness which 
the law normally extends to most affected creditors. This development has intensified 
the tension between procedural efficiency and creditor protection, giving rise to a 
growing debate questioning whether the disenfranchisement of certain affected 
creditors is a proportionate trade-off to achieve procedural efficiency.   
 
One the one hand, the efficiency-enhancing benefit in the pre-arranged sales is 
achieved by shifting more control to private parties (mainly incumbent management 
and key creditors) so that they act quickly in their strategic planning to prevent 
devaluation of business value.98 On the other hand, with the present watering down of 
procedural safeguards, the shifting of control tends to create a vacuum over the 
quality of the business decision-making process. This is intensified by the inherent 
information asymmetries permeating any possible check on the exercise of private 
parties’ discretionary power to fashion a rescue solution.   
 
The key criticism as regards the efficacy of the accelerated sales path in the context of 
a formal procedure is that it entails increased risk of erroneous undervaluation caused 
by fast sales and the watering down of procedural safeguards. The combined effects 
of the need for speed and the constriction of creditor participation place great pressure 
on the quality of decision-making that leads to the sale deal, as the process is opaque, 
giving parties enormous discretion to pick winners and losers largely free of judicial 
checks and balances. Moreover, the short timeframe often works as a defensive 
strategy making it difficult to judge whether decisions have been made correctly. 
Therefore, the absence of workable checks over the exercise of private parties’ 
discretionary power cannot be dismissed lightheartedly.  
 
                                                        
98 This is supported by empirical research finding that DIP lenders play an important role in screening 
viable companies, and in monitoring and generating information on the prospects of firms in Chapter 
11. See also FA Elayan and TO Meyer, ‘The Impact of Receiving Debtor-in-Possession Financing on 
the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent Under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy’, 28 Journal of 
Business, Finance & Accounting (2001) pp. 905-942. S Dahiya et al., ‘Debtor-in-Possession Financing 
and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence’, 69 Journal of Financial Economics (2003) pp. 259-
97. 
There are two mechanisms that could potentially provide effective checks and 
controls in the case of accelerated sales in insolvency. One is to offer affected parties 
pre-view rights before concluding the pre-arranged sale, including the opportunity to 
file objections to the proposed sale, as an important means of safeguarding their 
interests. Another mechanism is enhancement of judicial scrutiny or of that exercised 
by insolvency professionals acting as authorized court-officers. The former mainly 
addresses concerns that the need for speed often leaves non-participating creditors 
with very little opportunity to evaluate the case and that the short timeframe limits the 
ability of potential investors to gather information and to bid. The latter is to ensure 
effective gatekeeping independent of party objection when assessing the merits of 
relevant business decisions.  
1. Granting affected creditors a Pre-view right? 
 
In the US, the Report of the ABI Commission in 2014 recommended a 60-day 
moratorium on sales of substantially all assets so as to create a “breathing spell” to 
afford parties in interest (and competing bidders) a reasonable period of time to assess 
the proposed sale, and also to explore a stand-alone reorganization or other 
restructuring alternatives. 99 Similarly in the UK, the entirely disenfranchised position 
of junior creditors in pre-pack sales has led to a key reform proposal in the draft of the 
Insolvency (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules 2011. This would have required 
administrators to give a three-day notice to creditors when they propose to sell a 
significant proportion of the assets of a company or its business to a connected party, 
in circumstances where there has been no open marketing of those assets.100  
 
Nevertheless, both proposals were not adopted due to criticism as regards the direct 
and indirect costs associated with the ‘breathing spell’ where time matters as to the 
fluctuation of the value of the asset and the imminent need for additional financing 
                                                        
99 It further specified that the court should not shorten the 60-day moratorium unless the trustee or a 
party in interest“demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that there [was] a high likelihood 
that the value of the debtors’assets [would] decrease significantly”within those 60 days, and the 
court found that the proposed sale satisfied the standards set forth in the principles for section 363x 
sales. American Bankruptcy Institute, Final Report of the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of 
Chapter 11 (2014) (“the ABI Commission Report”) < 
https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h > accessed 30 May 2018, 83. 
100  See the Written Ministerial Statement on Pre-packaged Sales in Administrations (House of 
Commons Hansard Ministerial Statements on 31 March 2011, cm 29WS. 
during the moratorium period.101  
 
Naturally, when it comes to business sales, or in general, asset deployment, 
judgement on whether the deal maximizes value may be hard to formulate due to the 
inherent uncertainty regarding realizable value and ongoing commercial viability 
during the process. Determining the right course of action under various corporate 
rescue scenarios demands creativity, skills, judgment, anticipation, and taking into 
consideration of the uncertainty and impact.102 It also involves consideration of a wide 
range of assumptions regarding future and counter-factual data.103 This also means 
that decisions have to be judged in particular contexts and cannot be pre-ordained 
according to a fixed set of valuation rules. Accordingly, it makes sense to discuss 
asset deployment issues mostly in terms of the process through which such decisions 
are made. A review of the quality of the asset deployment decision itself will mainly 
rely on factors affecting the ability to obtain the best possible price such as timing, 
capacity of decision makers, ability to attract competing bids. If this is found to be 
flawed then some other course of action or valuation method could possibly be 
considered/taken into account. The combined introduction of an expedited review of 
process would add a layer of accountability in the process of pre-pack business sales 
for the following reasons.  
 
First, it is arguable that the importance of creditor voting may have changed in the 
context of business sales that go to a direction different from rescuing the company. 
Company rescue and reorganization is essentially a hypothetical sale under Chapter 
11, which intertwines the asset deployment and claimant entitlement issues.104 In this 
                                                        
101 The ABI Commission Report’s 60-days, has been criticized that it would likely only serve to harm 
secured creditors while providing little to no benefit to junior creditors given the need for additional 
financing during the moratorium period and the potential erosion of secured creditors’ collateral value. 
See Chapman And Cutler LLP, ‘Twin Daggers: Proposed 363(x) Amendments and Revisions to 
Adequate Protection Provisions Would Significantly Erode Secured Creditors’ Recoveries’ (Client 
Alert, January 2015). The UK’s 3 day’s notice period was abandoned because it was by insolvency 
professionals as too restrictive. Also because it would create a legal setting that could impede 
administrators from pursuing their statutory objectives expeditiously.  
102 Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: the Pre-pack Approach in Corporate Rescue, 301. 
103 Decision-makers must consider not only the causes of the financial disaster and the likelihood that 
remedial measures will reverse the problems, but must also consider the economic value of a range of 
options. See CW Frost, ‘Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial process’ 74 
(1995) North Carolina Law Review 75, 79. 
104 DA Skeel, Jr, ‘Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory’ (1993) Wisconsin 
Law Review 465, 473-74.  
case, creditors’ voting and approval is indispensable, indeed essential, to ensure due 
process and fundamental fairness as the reorganization plan is ‘fairly’ bargained and 
accepted, and to ensure sensible redistributive outcomes to be reached. In contrast, 
pre-arranged business sales replace the hypothetical sale with an actual sale which 
arguably separates the two issues. Namely, the pre-arranged sale focuses on the 
question of how assets are be deployed and not on how realizable value will be 
distributed, even though the efficacy of asset dispositions will affect the amount of 
value for distribution.  
 
Secondly, an expedited review process is more effective than just granting affected 
creditors broader rights. To begin with creditors voting and approval has limited 
practical importance in ensuring a good price. There may be a practical difficulty in 
identifying the affected claimholders who would be eligible to vote, due to the 
uncertainty of the value of the ailing business. As a result broadening creditor rights 
would create another layer of controversy by giving certain creditors the power to 
influence the process where they have no direct financial interest in the outcome of 
the sale or any other possible options. Furthermore, with pre-arranged sales the 
decision to pursue a sale takes place at a time when it is hard to tell whether a quick 
sale would have a higher expected return than a possible reorganization. This question 
also underscores the mismatched incentives of the different classes of creditors. On 
the one hand, senior creditors have an incentive to sell the company in a quick sale 
even when reorganization has a higher expected return for the estate. Junior creditors, 
on the other, may have an incentive to block the quick sale in favor of a drawn-out 
reorganization even when the sale has the higher expected return for the estate.  So, 
arguably, a creditors’ pre-view right instead of expedited judicial scrutiny could 
introduce a reverted anti-common issue to the accelerated sales in insolvency.  
2. Independent valuations to buttress court or administrator sanction and 
scrutiny 
 
The pre-arranged sale approach may alleviate the common anti-commons problems in 
corporate restructuring with the needed flexibility in the process so that decisions 
could be made in a timely manner. At the same time it entails enormous pressure vis-
à-vis the quality of commercial decision-making and the effectiveness of judicial 
verification of the economics of the pre-arranged sales. The accountability of the 
decision-making and enforcement institutions in this context becomes extremely 
important as they play a determining role in examining and verifying, in a speedy 
way, compliance with the pre-existing requirements, rather than being used as rubber-
stabbing bodies.  
 
UK law places its full faith with a neutral decision-making body, namely, the 
administrator. Nevertheless, UK pre-pack sales are not free from controversy due to 
the frequency of the phenomenon of business sales to connected parties. Lack of 
impartial monitoring of pre-packs in UK law creates a risk that pre-formal 
negotiations are carried out in a self-serving manner by insiders. Statement of 
Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16)105 strives to ameliorate the concerns the concerns 
raised by pre-pack sales to connected parties. It focuses on enhancing transparency of 
the accelerated sale process through comprehensive ex post information disclosure 
requirements. Following the Graham Review into Prepack administrations in 2014, 
SIP 16 was further revised in 2015 requiring enhanced disclosures to creditors. 
Directors of the company concerned should be advised that any pre-administration 
marketing should comply with 'marketing essentials' and that any valuations should 
be carried out by appropriate independent valuers who hold adequate professional 
indemnity insurance. Nevertheless, non-compliance with this professional guidance 
standard is dealt with by the regulators of insolvency professionals as part of a 
possible disciplinary action and the use of independent valuers is neither mandatory 
nor particularly successful. The rigor of the insolvency professional regulators in 
detecting instances of abuse and dealing with them has been seriously doubted. 
Professional bodies discharging a dual role of promoting and, at the same time, 
regulating the profession may show no zeal in prosecuting and enforcing breaches of 
professional standards to protect outside stakeholders, notwithstanding some concerns 
about reputation preservation.  
 
Lack of trust in the even-handedness of administrators and the current light touch 
regulatory approach in Britain necessitates some fresh thinking about the duties of 
                                                        
105 SIP 16 is adopted by all the relevant professional regulatory bodies and has been revised twice 
since its introduction in 2009. The latest edition SIP 16 – Pre-packaged Sales in Administrations, was 
effective from 1 November 2015. 
administrators in the case of connected pre-pack sales. In order to ensure a level 
playing field in the pre-packing process, one significant initiative has been the 
establishment of a Pre-pack Pool in 2015 as a response to recommendations made in 
the Graham Review into Prepack administrations in 2014. It offers an option to 
connected party purchasers before the sale to approach the Pool of experienced 
business people who can provide a level of independent scrutiny of connected party 
pre-pack sales.106 The applicant will decide what material will be presented to the pool 
member to opine on. After scrutinizing the documents, the pool member will issue a 
statement. Regardless whether the resulting statement is negative or positive,107 it will 
be referred to in the SIP 16 statement to the attention of the creditors. The Pool 
member will not issue reasons for its decision, the justification being that this would 
cause delay and increase costs. The pool member’s decision is not subject to appeal. 
The establishment of the Pool is a positive development, and its utility in enhancing 
scrutiny is obvious.108 Yet the general effectiveness of the pool is limited. First of all, 
use of the Pool is voluntary, and it is merely available to use by connected party 
purchasers. In the first 14 months of operation the Pool has received 53 applications 
which equate to 28% of the total number of connected party pre-packs during the 
same period.109 Moreover, the questionable adequacy of the material supplied to the 
pool member which serves as the basis of the statement may also cast questions on the 
credibility of the ensuing opinion. 
 
Amid all these doubts about the current pre-pack process, the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 introduced a reserve power for the Secretary of 
                                                        
106  It was launched following the recommendations of the Graham Review of ‘pre-pack’ 
administrations.  
107 The Pool member can issue one of three opinions:  
1. Nothing has been found to suggest that the grounds for the proposed pre-packaged sale are 
unreasonable;  
2. The evidence provided has been limited in some areas, but otherwise nothing has been found to 
suggest that the grounds for the proposed pre-packaged sale are unreasonable; or  
3. There is a lack of evidence to support a statement that the grounds for the proposed pre-packaged 
sale are reasonable.   
 
108 E.g. where the statement from the Pool member suggests that there is lack of sufficient evidence to 
support a pre-pack sale, then an administrator who decides to proceed with the sale regardless he/she 
may have to give a clear explanation as to why the sale took place in the SIP 16 statement. 
109 Pre-pack Pool Limited, The Annual Review 2016 (1 November 2015 and 31 December 2016), 
polished in March 2007 https://www.prepackpool.co.uk/uploads/files/documents/Pre-
pack%20Pool%20Annual%20Review%202016-17.pdf accessed 30 May 2018. 
State making it possible to create regulations to either prohibit administration sales to 
connected parties or to impose conditions or requirements to allow a connected party 
sale to proceed.110 This power lapses five years after commencement and it would 
only be exercised if the guidance in the newly released SIP 16 and the Pre-Pack Pool 
prove to be unsuccessful in containing the most controversial aspects of pre-pack 
sales.  
 
There is mounting evidence that the application of SIP 16 has not closed most of the 
discussed loopholes. Empirical research suggests that, while independent valuations 
have been conducted in the majority of pre-pack cases, the quality of valuations is 
very poor; many were simply desk-top valuations and the valuation did not include all 
of the available assets, e.g. intellectual property or goodwill. 111  Similarly, the 
valuation methods used by independent valuers are rarely explained.112 As a result, 
creditors often find administrators’ reports to be no more than a compliance checklist 
inadequate to address creditors’ legitimate questions on whether sales are proceeding 
more quickly than is necessary. This is of course a key value question since 
unnecessary speed can potentially reduce the value available to creditors, especially 
where a robust auction process has been eschewed or other restructuring alternatives 
have not been explored.  
 
The most important concern is of course value maximization since the best way to 
enhance the fairness of payment allocations is to maximize the realized value of the 
business or of the asset pool to be disposed of. But optimization of going concern 
surplus may not be achieved by selling the business prematurely or exploration of 
other restructuring alternatives. To justify an accelerated sale in this case, two criteria 
must be  considered: First, the urgency of the sale, for example where a delay to sell 
                                                        
110 Section 129 of Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. The power to make 
regulations will enable the Secretary of State to: 
i. prohibit sales. 
ii. allow sales to take place subject to the imposition of restrictions or conditions. 
iii. provide for the requirement to obtain approval from the court, the creditors of the company, or other 
person of a description specified in the regulations. 
 
111  See P Walton and C Umfreville, Pre-pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and Outcome 
Analysis of Pre-pack Administration. An independent valuation was conducted in the overwhelming 
majority (91%) of cases surveyed. 
 
112 Ibid., 84. 
may lead to lower offers. Secondly, the offered price must be a fair price at the time; 
you cannot just sell at any price, especially if a set of recent circumstances have 
impaired market expectations of value.113 The starting point must be the actual current 
value of the company, namely, its going concern value, since the proposed sale is a 
going concern sale. Once that value had been determined it would become possible to 
ascertain whether it is a fair value.  
 
But judges and administrators are not expert valuers of business assets and business 
sales. It is therefore essential to equip the courts or the administrators with an 
expansive and timely valuation conducted by independent expert valuers in order to 
perform the verification tasks enhancing the legitimacy of the process and the choice 
of fast-tracked sales. 
 
For this reason and in order to avoid stricter restrictions of connected party pre-pack 
sales in the future, I argue here that the current regulatory framework should be 
modified to add a staggered element of accountability that makes independent 
valuations for sales above a certain value mandatory. The threshold may be objective, 
for instance when individual assets of more than 1 million in value are disposed of or 
when an entire business is sold for 5 million. An expansive independent valuation 
could be costly and makes sense from a cost-benefit analysis point of view only with 
respect to higher value transactions where more is at stake in terms of creditor losses 
and general economic welfare. Moreover, the pool of assets in such cases would be 
substantial allowing the pool to bear the cost of hiring an outside expert. While this 
threshold is somewhat arbitrary it is beyond question that the bigger the business and 
higher the value of the transaction the higher the costs generated by undervalued 
business sales. Moreover, the parties would be more willing to incur the cost of 
obtaining an independent valuation if the prospect of losses by an undervalued sale is 
higher. 
 
                                                        
113 E.g., the business might have suffered recent distress which, predictably, has sent a negative 
signal to the market limiting the number of potential purchasers or interested buyers make lower 
offers. 
 
Alternatively, instead of numerical thresholds independent valuations may be 
mandatorily required in those cases where the market has not been properly tested or 
the marketing was done in a perfunctory manner.114  Independent valuations may 
prove particularly useful where, in particular, it is claimed that a true auction and 
competitive sale proceedings were impractical and there was no free access to 
information to establish the fairness of the sale price or adequate time to generate 
competing bids. 
 
In both cases the valuation methods and benchmarks used should be as close as 
possible to “market value”. To add further credibility, historical data and comparative 
market and industry data about the value of similar businesses should be evaluated, 
where that is possible. In this context, the subject matter of the business, its location 
and client base, and sales growth in the relevant industry should also be examined. If 
time limits cannot permit comprehensive independent evaluation, the valuation report 
should identify the assets that were excluded from the valuations and all other 
limitations. 
 
Further research is required to investigate the cost of substantive independent 
valuations and to understand the effect of valuation on the course of decision making. 
Relevant costs include direct expenditure like the cost of obtaining expert valuers and 
indirect costs (i.e. for disturbing the finality of the sale and bringing further 
complication that may disincentivise potential purchasers).  
 
There are several other arguments mitigating in favour of mandatory independent 
valuations for sales above a certain threshold or for sales with procedural weaknesses. 
First, the cost of a substantive independent valuation may be set off by incentivising 
exploration of alternative courses of action that would maximize the value of pre-
arranged sales. Secondly, it would augment the quality of court or administrator 
scrutiny as it would be the foundation of their judgement about the reasonableness of 
the offered price. Third, it gives creditors, especially junior creditors, an insight into 
objectivity of the decision making process ameliorating widespread information 
asymmetries that currently plague the accelerated process and enhancing its 
                                                        
114 Namely, there was minimal advertising, and little efforts are made to identify potential purchasers. 
legitimacy on both sides of the Atlantic. By sacrificing a minimum of procedural 
efficiency the recommended amendments reverse, to some extent, junior creditor 
disenfranchisement, and may protect administrators from the rising tide of creditor 
complaints.  
 
The US regime operates on the debtor-in-possession principle, at the same time, 
deploys much intervention from the bankruptcy courts. Yet it is similarly short of 
requisite safeguards when it comes to the plaited approach. With US 363 sales, the 
law requires the proposed sales to be authorized by bankruptcy courts by exercising 
judicial discretion. To counteract recent concerns, the case law has been evolving in 
providing effective guidelines for in distinguishing permissible s 363 pre-plan sales 
from those that open the bankruptcy process to potential abuse. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of a negotiated resolution between all affected claimholders, the courts are 
left to stand astride complex valuation disputes, since bankruptcy court approval of a 
sale becomes the last scrutinizing measure before its completion. This move, however, 
not only runs counter to the trend away from substantive judicial review of the 
business merits of particular transactions, but may also assign to the courts an 
uncomfortable role. This new function is different from their traditional role of 
ensuring that legislative standards have been complied with in the negotiation and 
decision-making process. Essentially, it begs the old question- are courts really better 
placed to tackle the issues and meet the challenges involved in matters of commercial 
judgment? At the same time, it has been said that bankruptcy judges are powerless to 
assume the responsibility of preventing inadequate-price sales, because they can only 
act on information and transactions that are presented to them.115 
 
The US courts could also incorporate in the existing framework a similar requirement 
for a credible expert opinion when sanctioning a business sale under s. 363, where: (a) 
the value of the company exceeds 5 million dollars, or (b) the value of the assets to be 
disposed is over 1 million dollars, and (c) where the deal presents procedural defects.  
                                                        
115 It is concerned that managers' informational advantages coupled with their control over the initiation 
of business decisions may allow them to manipulate the decision making apparatus to their benefit. See 
CW Frost, ‘The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy 
Reorganization’, at 114 and BL Zaretsky, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11, (1993) 44 South 
Carolina Law Review 907, 914. 
American Judges would be able to use this opinion as an additional basis for their 
decision in addition to the parties’ filings. At the very least this process will insert 
another level of control in the case that the business to be disposed of is grossly 
undervalued curbing at least the most egregious of abuses in the accelerated sales 
process without aggravating the commons anti-commons problem. 
 
One may rightly question the necessity of this extra layer of valuation on the basis of 
a cost benefit analysis given many s.363 sales involve identification of an initial 
bidder, known as the stalking horse, and are possibly followed by an auction 
procedure. It is true a robust auction process is most efficient in minimizing 
opportunism in the process and in establishing a fair market price for the business that 
can then be used by the bankruptcy court for evaluation of various alternatives. This 
assumption is however challenged in the context of quick 363(b) sales. One obvious 
reason is that the short timeframe limits the ability of other bidders to gather 
information or participate in the process. 
Furthermore, the auction process is costly for potential bidders, especially in the case 
of insolvency of large public companies, as they are difficult and expensive to 
evaluate.116 To overcome the cost of losing the bid, the debtors often offer bidding 
incentives to a stalking horse with breakup fees if they were outbid. These incentives 
would likely attract stalking horses who would not otherwise have bid, making it even 
more difficult for second bidders. 117
 
The rarity with which stalking horses are 
displaced makes apparent that, in the absence of effective court oversight, the sale 
process is vulnerable to subversion. 
 
The difficult task for the court is to minimize the uncertainties associated with the 
essential validity of the business so as to balance the interests of protecting creditor 
rights without sacrificing the most attractive aspect of pre-plan sales- speed. 
Bankruptcy courts should endeavor to minimize erroneous deprivation/ trading off 
between procedural efficiency and creditor protection if this becomes unavoidable. 
There is no practical principle to guide such an exercise. Perhaps insisting on an 
optimal solution for the debtor and avoiding undervalued sales in all cases is a fool’s 
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117 Ibid. 41-2. LoPucki and Doherty’s empirical research suggests that second bidders appeared in only 
35% of the  cases surveyed and were successful in only 17% of those cases.  
errand. The most we can expect is the system being able to detect and prevent the 
cases where the potential harm to the business value from a quick sale pushed through 
by opportunistic use of the time urgency argument. Therefore, issues of valuation are 
at the heart of the adequate protection determination.  
 
Much of course will depend on the integrity and the professional competence of the 
valuers who would be assumed to have strong expertise in distressed business 
transactions. While all observed problems with private gatekeepers would still apply 
here, the fact that the valuer is paid by the pool of creditors secures relevant 
independence from the parties connected to the sale and impartiality of professional 
judgement. The rationale is not dissimilar with that underlying the UK and US 
Corporate statutes and stock exchange regulations making compulsory the 
engagement of independent auditors in the scrutiny and verification of public 
companies’ accounts. In addition, one would expect that independent valuers would 
be governed by the same strict professional standards as corporate auditors.  Either 
way the proposals offered here do not require any creditor initiative and thus they still 
restrict the room for creditor’s strategic behavior, while at the same time they 
significantly level the playing field between insiders and junior creditors. 
 
E Conclusion  
 
Value realization by way of pre-arranged business sales under the formal procedure 
can be implemented and consummated more quickly and at far lower cost than a sale 
done as part of the formal procedure. Although the process adopted by each 
jurisdiction is different, the popularity of pre-arranged business sales in the two 
countries under consideration suggests that the accelerated sales path through a formal 
procedure increasingly serves as the preferred option of resolving corporate distress. 
On the one hand, the accelerated approach permits the timely disposal of the failing 
business, serving as an economically efficient mechanism for the preservation of the 
going concern value of an ailing business. On the other hand, the accelerated 
approach to business sales in insolvency enables certain parties to customize statutory 
procedures in a way that upsets, to some extent, the balance between the debtor and 
some creditors. It, also, tends to shift the key properties of the statutory procedures 
from creditor coordination and plan formulation towards verification of pre-arranged 
transactions. In doing so it creates a vacuum of control over the quality of the 
business decision–making and eliminates the inclusiveness of the statutory procedure 
leaving ample room for rent-seeking by insiders and repeat players. Allegations of 
erroneous undervaluations caused by fast sales undermine the legitimacy of the entire 
process.  
 
To mitigate these deficiencies, the law requires a system of controls that minimizes 
opportunistic behavior and prevents stakeholders from exploiting the insolvency 
process to create value-destroying opportunities or to capture value from other 
stakeholders. Action must be taken to reduce both the likelihood and efficacy of 
strategic behavior. As we discussed above, although the answer at this stage should be 
close scrutiny rather than imposing substantive regulation of accelerated business 
sales, a more rigorous incremental progress in ensuring tight scrutiny and 
accountability of connected party accelerated sales is very much needed. This, as 
argued in the article, requires a more responsive approach by the enforcement 
institutions, either administrators or the bankruptcy courts, especially in substituting 
the market test with independent expert scrutiny. The staggered approach to augment 
independent scrutiny, as proposed here, would equip the courts and/or the 
administrators with the required tools to perform the verification tasks assigned to 
them with enhanced competency and vigour. It would also substantially improve the 
legitimacy of the accelerated business approach without harming the business efficacy 
goals attached to this procedure. 
